BEHAVIORAL REACTION TO THE 2008 INCOME TAX REFORM IN INDONESIA: A BUNCHING ANALYSIS by Putra, Chandra Tris Fajar Uji & Bayer, Ralp-Christopher
BEHAVIORAL REACTION TO THE 2008 INCOME TAX REFORM IN INDONESIA: A BUNCHING ANALYSIS 
Chandra Tris Fajar Uji Putra, Ralph-Christopher Bayer 
 
   Page 1 | 
 
 
BEHAVIORAL REACTION TO THE 2008 INCOME TAX REFORM 
IN INDONESIA: A BUNCHING ANALYSIS 
 
1 Chandra Tris Fajar Uji Putra  
University of Adelaide, Universitas Indonesia 
chandratris.fajarujiputra@gmail.com 
2 Ralph-Christopher Bayer  
University of Adelaide 
 
A R T I C L E   I N F O 
 
First Received: 
[04 December 2019] 
 
Revised: 
[03 July 2020] 
 
Accepted: 
[08 July 2020] 
 
Keywords: 
bunching, self-employment, evasion 
 A B S T R A C T 
 
Income tax reforms generally constitute some changes in 
marginal tax rates and its income thresholds which often lead 
to a higher tax liability. Taxpayers may respond to these 
changes differently, mainly by trying to lower their tax 
payments. Self-employed individuals have a greater incentive 
to strategically adjust to a lower income declaration. Using 
administrative tax data, this paper examines the reaction of 
self-employed taxpayers to the 2008 Indonesian Income Tax 
Reform using bunching analysis. Beside a clear evidence on 
bunching around the first kink point, our empirical findings 
suggest that Indonesia exhibits special cases. We find an 
inertia of pre-reform bunching around the first kink point in 
later years as well as an extraordinary bunching above the first 
kink point in the post-reform periods. 
 
Penelitian ini berisi analisis tentang bagaimana wajib pajak 
merespon perubahan ketentuan perpajakan, khususnya pajak 
penghasilan. Penelitian ini menggunakan data Surat 
Pemberitahuan Tahunan Pajak Penghasilan periode 2006-
2012 untuk menjelaskan perilaku Wajib Pajak Orang Pribadi 
yang melakukan kegiatan usaha sehubungan dengan 
perubahan dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 36 Tahun 2008 
menggunakan metode bunching. Penelitian ini menemukan 
adanya perilaku bunching pada titik batas pertama, yaitu pada 
batasan penghasilan yang dikenakan tarif pajak terendah. 
Disamping itu, penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa Wajib 
Pajak di Indonesia menunjukkan perilaku yang unik. Terdapat 
resistensi wajib pajak dalam melaporkan penghasilan 
meskipun batasan tarif pajak paling rendah berubah. Juga, 
terdapat perilaku bunching yang unik di atas batasan 
penghasilan yang dikenakan tarif pajak penghasilan sebesar 
10% yang mengindikasikan penghindaran pajak. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the biggest global challenges for 
governments is tax evasion since it hinders tax revenue 
collection and results in slower economic development 
(Picur & Riahi-Belkaoui 2006). Tax evasion in general 
consists of deliberate violation of tax law to evade tax 
payments (Réthi 2012) and can take various forms, such 
as refraining from declaring taxable income truthfully 
(Sandmo 2015, p.645) and over-reporting tax 
exemptions, deductions, or credits (Alm & Martinez-
Vazquez 2003, p.146). In addition, evasion is more likely 
to occur in income tax than other types of taxes 
(Allingham & Sandmo 1972) due to its self-assessment 
system and the strategic decision making of taxpayers 
under uncertainty. A taxpayer may declare his actual 
income or less in his tax return without being directly 
penalized until a supervision by Account Representative 
or a tax audit by tax auditor is being done, which creates 
an incentive to evade tax. In contrast, commodity taxes, 
for instance, provide limited opportunity to evade 
because people have to pay the tax as the transaction 
occurs. Due to its negative impact on revenue, this 
problem is taken seriously by governments which exert 
great effort to discover tax evasion behavior or deter 
evasion prior to tax audit. 
 
Both governments and researchers have been 
exploring various techniques to identify and measure 
tax evasion. Direct approaches which rely on taxpayer 
data, surveys and audit (Khlif & Achek 2015), and 
indirect approaches using estimation of the size of the 
hidden economy (Schneider & Enste 2002, 2000) are 
typical methods applied in the contemporary literature. 
The discussion of tax evasion detection techniques 
began with the incorporation of behavior analysis, 
pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), who 
studied reporting income of individual taxpayers under 
uncertainty. Exploration of psychology followed, such as 
the experiences of taxpayers with audit probability and 
penalty on evasion (Bruttel & Friehe 2014; Soliman, 
Jones & Cullis 2014; Tan & Yim 2014). 
 
Empirical study is crucial to tax institutions since it 
depicts the actual responses of taxpayers who are not 
perfectly rational and have inconsistent preferences 
(Congdon, Kling & Mullainathan 2009) particularly in the 
presence of reforms. These changes in income tax, 
which can take a form of adjustment in tax rates, base, 
and deductions, will affect taxpayers nonlinearly and 
result in different responses. For instance, self-
employed taxpayers typically have greater incentives to 
misreport income than wage earners (Heim 2010). 
Consequently, behavior analysis has been developing in 
taxation studies, and one of the approaches, bunching, 
was introduced by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) 
to signal behavioral responses of taxpayers. 
 
Bunching in taxes can detect some motives that 
govern behavior, such as optimizing frictions (see Chetty 
et al. 2011; Kleven & Schultz 2014; Kleven & Waseem 
2013; Saez 2010) or tax evasion and enforcement (see 
Almunia & Lopez-rodriguez 2018; Best et al. 2015; 
Dwenger et al. 2016; Fack & Landais 2016; Kiss & 
Mosberger 2015; Kleven et al. 2011). However, this 
approach requires large data sets with low 
measurement error (Kleven 2016) which cannot be 
provided by survey or experiment. 
 
This paper aims to explore whether we can use the 
changes in the tax rules to find evidence of tax evasion. 
We examine tax returns from the 2008 income tax 
reform period, which resulted in wider income 
thresholds. These changes create discontinuities in the 
slope of choice sets where taxpayers can decide how 
much income to declare given the rate changes apply to 
their reported income. We focus on self-employed 
individuals since each of them acts as a single decision 
maker with respect to taxation so that their action may 
represent their behavior toward changes in tax rules. In 
contrast, an action of a corporate taxpayer may be 
decided by many people behind it such as the CEO, COO, 
tax managers and tax consultants. Furthermore, we 
have no access on corporate tax return data. 
 
This paper contributes to research in Indonesia, 
particularly by providing an empirical study on tax 
evasion with respect to tax reform. More importantly, 
we have an excellent opportunity to exploit tax return 
data, which for some countries is highly confidential. So, 
to our knowledge, this study will be the first to present 
empirical analysis of real administrative data for 
Indonesia using bunching. In addition, the results of this 
paper are expected to present tax institution 
suggestions in designing tax policy to deter tax evasion. 
As bunching can be a signal of tax evasion, the tax 
authority could utilize this evidence to strategically 
conduct tax audits targeting taxpayers who display 
bunching.  
 
Our results exhibit evidence of bunching that 
differs from the literature except for bunching at the 
first kink. Firstly, we find obvious bunching at just before 
the first kink, although the 2009-2012 spikes are less 
strong than pre-reform periods. Secondly, we find a 
noticeable inertia of bunching at the pre-reform first 
kink in the post-reform periods. Even though the kink 
was shifted from IDR 24 million to IDR 50 million, some 
taxpayers declared IDR 24 million of taxable income 
from 2009 onwards, suggesting that these individuals 
might not have realized that the threshold increased. 
Finally, we find an extraordinary bunching where people 
declare above the first kink after the tax reform.  We 
conduct an investigation on people declaring taxable 
income of IDR 50-54 million in 2009 and find 
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that these individuals come from those who reported 
less than IDR 54 million in the previous year. We 
conclude that these people are likely to engage in tax 
evasion by strategically declaring taxable income above 
the threshold without any improvements in 
macroeconomic conditions. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the 2008 income tax reform and how income 
tax works in Indonesia. In section 3 we provide the 
research methodology of this paper. Section 4 exhibits 
the empirical evidence of the bunching approach. 
Finally, section 4 presents our conclusions and policy 
implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Previous studies in the literature on bunching 
provides mixed results. Using the United States of 
America (US) tax data from 1960-2008, Saez (2010) 
found visible bunching only at the first kink point of two 
schedules for self-employed people: the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) schedule where qualified taxpayers 
start receiving refundable tax credit, and federal income 
tax bracket in which the first tax rate applies. He found 
no evidence of bunching on wage earners. In contrast, 
Heim (2010) analyzed a smaller sample of 1987-1996 US 
data and suggested that taxpayers whose income were 
around the first income tax threshold behave less 
responsively. Kleven et al. (2011) who analysed Danish 
tax data found that there was no tax evasion by wage 
earner taxpayers due to the third-party reporting 
mechanism, while tax evasion existed in self-reported 
income. Later, Kleven and Schultz (2014) found a visible 
bunching on the top income distribution of Danish 
taxpayers with surprisingly low income elasticities, 
representing a quite modest response to relatively high 
tax rate changes. This evidence supports their argument 
that the Danish tax system provides few opportunities 
to evade tax. Using the same setting, Chetty et al. (2011) 
distinguished bunching evidence between employment 
status and suggested that wage earner taxpayers 
display bunching at the first kink point when the tax 
changes are relatively large, i.e. the changes in net-of-
tax wage is larger than 10%, while bunching by the self-
employed is found at both small and large kink points. 
 
Based on the tax subject or taxable entity, we 
acknowledge that Indonesian taxation system has 
corporate income tax and personal income tax. 
Corporate income tax is applied to firms, and it was 
initially a progressive tax with the highest marginal rate 
of 30%. Personal income tax is imposed on individuals 
whose income is more than the non-taxable income 
known as income threshold. 
 
Individual taxpayers can be wage earners or self-
employed taxpayers depending on the sources of 
income, and 
they are treated differently with respect to tax liabilities. 
Typically, income tax of wage-earning individuals is 
mostly withheld by a firm. Thus, they are classified as 
low risk taxpayers. As long as these individuals do not 
earn income from other sources, they are liable to file 
the tax returns and report withholding tax from their 
wages. On the other hand, individuals who earn income 
other than from employment are categorized as self-
employed taxpayers. They have to account for their 
taxable income based on their bookkeeping themselves. 
 
Indonesia began the tax reform in 1983 by enacting 
three pillars of the taxation systems, i.e. Law No. 6/ 1983 
concerning General Provisions and Tax Procedures, Law 
No. 7/ 1983 concerning Income Tax, and Law No. 8/ 
1983 concerning Value Added Tax of Goods and Services 
and Sale Tax on Luxury Goods. Since then Indonesia has 
succeeded in increasing its tax revenue, and taxes have 
become the major source of government revenue 
superseding revenues from oil and natural resources 
(Wijayanto & Vidyattama 2017). It is important to 
understand the scope of tax reforms in our analysis so 
that we can observe the effect on taxpayers’ behavior. 
We must also consider the data, i.e. administrative tax 
returns data, together with the changes in the tax 
system. Consequently, the main discussion of this paper 
will focus on the enactment of Law No. 36/2008 which 
legislated changes in tax rates, as in Table 1.  
(Table 1 here) 
There have been modest changes in the threshold 
for current income tax regulation, with a general 
decrease in the marginal tax rates, in nominal terms. 
The lowest tax rate is now applied up to the first two 
brackets in the previous law, i.e. IDR 50 million, whereas 
the highest rate is reduced to 30%. Other significant 
changes lie in wider ranges of thresholds with the top 
cut-off now more than twice as high as in the earlier 
system. This disparity may induce high-income earners 
to under-declare their income to shift their income 
(Yuwono 2008). Furthermore, Yuwono emphasizes that 
by exploring the distributional effect of this tax reform 
we can estimate behavioral responses and generate 
policy analysis. 
 
Apart from tax rates, there have been a series of 
changes in personal deductions for family status and 
dependents, known as nontaxable income. The 
amounts of nontaxable income vary with marital status 
and number of dependents. These amounts change in 
accordance with changes in the cost of living standard, 
as shown in Table 2. However, since these changes are 
not subject to choice after the beginning of a fiscal year, 
nontaxable income reform is not considered as a source 
of bunching (Kleven 2016). 
 
(Table 2 here) 
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The 2008 income tax reform created changes in 
the kink points at which bunching may appear. These 
kinks are generated by discontinuities, or increases in 
this case, in marginal tax rates. In pre-reform periods, 
the upper limits of taxable income brackets, i.e. IDR 25 
million, 50 million, 100 million and 200 million, may 
provide the highest cutoffs where taxpayers would 
bunch because beyond these points, they are levied 
with higher tax rates. The kink points in post-reform 
periods are likely to lie in IDR 50 million, 250 million and 
500 million of taxable income. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
In this paper, we follow a simple model of tax 
bunching introduced by Saez (2010). We also follow 
theoretical model introduced by Kleven (2016) in which 
individuals’ utility functions are defined over income 
and value of effort to generate income. The utility 
function is written as 𝑢(𝑧 − 𝑇(𝑧), 𝑧/𝑛) where 𝑧 
represents income, 𝑇(𝑧) is tax as a function of income, 
and 𝑛 is ability. There is heterogeneity in ability due to 
differences in preference or ability, and this is captured 
by the probability density distribution 𝑓(𝑛). Then, 
income is distributed following a smooth probability 
density distribution ℎ(𝑧). Assume further that the tax 
system is linear, so 𝑇(𝑧) = 𝑡 𝑧. 
 
Now, suppose that there is an increase in the 
marginal tax rate from 𝑡 to 𝑡 + ∆𝑡 at the income 
threshold 𝑧∗. This means that a kink is introduced at 
income 𝑧∗. Then, the tax function at the kink point is 
𝑇(𝑧) = 𝑡 𝑧 + ∆𝑡 (𝑧 − 𝑧∗) 𝐼(𝑧 > 𝑧∗)  where 𝐼(. ) is an 
indicator function. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of 
introducing kink point in the tax function. 
 
Figure 1. Bunching at kink point
 
Source: Kleven (2016) 
Initially, an individual with ability 𝑛∗ chooses 
income 𝑛∗, and similarly individuals having ability 𝑛∗ +
∆𝑛∗ choose income 𝑧∗ + ∆𝑧∗. When the marginal tax 
rate increases at 𝑧∗ + ∆𝑧∗, this kink will produce 
bunching of individuals who were previously located in 
the income distribution 𝑧∗ + ∆𝑧∗ to move down to 𝑧∗, 
while other individuals who were located above the 
𝑧∗ + ∆𝑧∗ area will stay in their location. The same 
behavior is observed for individuals located at 𝑧∗ prior 
to the change of marginal tax rate. When more people 
do the similar reactions, they will be shifted to certain 
income level they would choose. As a result, there will 
be excess mass in the distribution of individuals at the 
kink point, 𝑧∗. This bunching can be seen from spikes in 
the data distribution diagram. 
 
The standard theoretical model of bunching stated 
above provides explanation for labor supply model in 
which an individual may reduce his effort following an 
increase in marginal tax rate. Then, if bunching we 
would observe in our data is due to the reduction of 
effort, the taxpayers’ responses clarify the rationale of 
adverse incentive to work (Paetzold 2019, p.188). 
Consequently, we will get welfare losses because of the 
distortion of the income tax system. 
 
Another channel of explaining the behavioral 
responses of taxpayers to the tax reform is tax evasion. 
The theoretical framework for evasion works in a similar 
fashion to the labor supply model. Instead of lowering 
their working effort, individuals may react to the 
changes in income tax by under-reporting their taxable 
income to avoid being imposed by a higher marginal tax 
rate. A study by Kleven et al. (2011) presents both how 
the theory works and its empirical results. 
 
Having these two possibilities in justifying the 
bunching response, we then need to determine which 
path accommodates our data. We analyse the 
Indonesian data for individual self-employed tax return 
covering more than 400,000 people in each year. The 
average taxable income reported by these tax filers is 
showing an upward trend starting from IDR 28 million in 
2006 up to IDR 42 million in 2012 (see table 3). This 
figure suggests that most Indonesian taxpayers earn a 
relatively low income and generally this income group 
would sacrifice more of their leisure to exert more effort 
to work. Hence, their behavioral reactions toward the 
changes in tax rules presumably are more likely due to 
the tax evasion rather than the reduction of effort. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
To begin this discussion, we would like to explain 
the changes in Indonesian income tax rules. Indonesia 
began the tax reform in 1983 by enacting three pillars of 
the taxation systems, i.e. Law No. 6/ 1983 concerning 
General Provisions and Tax Procedures, Law No. 7/ 1983 
concerning Income Tax, and Law No. 8/ 1983 concerning 
Value Added Tax of Goods and Services and Sale Tax on 
Luxury Goods. Since then Indonesia has succeeded in 
increasing its tax revenue, and taxes have become the 
major source of government revenue superseding 
revenues from oil and natural resources (Wijayanto & 
Vidyattama 2017). It is important to understand the 
scope of tax reforms in our analysis so that we can 
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observe the effect on taxpayers’ behavior. We must also 
consider the data, i.e. administrative tax returns data, 
together with the changes in the tax system. 
Consequently, the main discussion of this paper will 
focus on the enactment of Law No. 36/2008 which 
legislated changes in tax rates, as in Table 1.  
(Table 1 here) 
There have been modest changes in the threshold 
for current income tax regulation, with a general 
decrease in the marginal tax rates, in nominal terms. 
The lowest tax rate is now applied up to the first two 
brackets in the previous law, i.e. IDR 50 million, whereas 
the highest rate is reduced to 30%. Other significant 
changes lie in wider ranges of thresholds with the top 
cut-off now more than twice as high as in the earlier 
system. This disparity may induce high-income earners 
to under-declare their income to shift their income 
(Yuwono 2008). Furthermore, Yuwono emphasizes that 
by exploring the distributional effect of this tax reform 
we can estimate behavioral responses and generate 
policy analysis. 
 
Apart from tax rates, there have been a series of 
changes in personal deductions for family status and 
dependents, known as nontaxable income. The 
amounts of nontaxable income vary with marital status 
and number of dependents. These amounts change in 
accordance with changes in the cost of living standard, 
as shown in Table 2. However, since these changes are 
not subject to choice after the beginning of a fiscal year, 
nontaxable income reform is not considered as a source 
of bunching (Kleven 2016). 
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
The 2008 income tax reform created changes in 
the kink points at which bunching may appear. These 
kinks are generated by discontinuities, or increases in 
this case, in marginal tax rates. In pre-reform periods, 
the upper limits of taxable income brackets, i.e. IDR 25 
million, 50 million, 100 million and 200 million, may 
provide the highest cutoffs where taxpayers would 
bunch because beyond these points, they are levied 
with higher tax rates. The kink points in post-reform 
periods are likely to lie in IDR 50 million, 250 million and 
500 million of taxable income. 
 
We obtain access to administrative data from 
income tax returns between 2006 and 2017 specifically 
for self-employed individuals. The data covers 8.7 
million individual business owners. In this paper, 
however, we will only use those filed tax returns until 
2012, covering 4.15 million individuals and an average 
of IDR 35.48 million of annual taxable income, as listed 
in Table 3. 
(Table 3 here) 
The main reason we exclude data from 2013 
onward is that another income tax reform was enacted 
in July 2013 with the implementation of Government 
Regulation No. 46 Year 2013 (PP 46) concerning “Income 
tax on income from business received or acquired by 
taxpayers having certain gross turnover”. By this law, 
taxpayers with an annual gross turnover up to IDR 4.8 
billion are subject to 1% final tax based on gross income, 
regardless of net loss. This assumes a different income 
concept for these groups, in that final taxpayers use 
gross income, whereas regular income taxpayers apply 
a taxable income concept taking into account any 
deductions. Consequently, the kink points referred to in 
the previous section do not apply to this group of 
taxpayers. 
 
Furthermore, the final taxpayer group is still 
required to file the 1770 tax return in which they report 
gross income at section 1770-III but report zero taxable 
income at section 1770. On the other hand, the regular 
income tax mechanism requires taxpayers to declare 
net income at 1770. As a result, we cannot distinguish 
individual taxpayers with zero taxable income due to net 
loss from those who are subject to 1% final tax payment, 
and therefore we exclude the data from 2013 onward. 
  
4.2 Bunching Around the First Kink 
 
We define the kink points around which bunching 
would appear as the cutoff levels of taxable income. In 
the periods prior to the 2008 tax reform, the first kink 
point is at IDR 25 million taxable income with a 5% tax 
rate, while IDR 50 million, 100 million, and 200 million 
are the second, third, and the last kink points 
respectively. The marginal tax rate increases by 5% for 
the second kink, whereas the two higher kink points 
experience a 10% increase. Thus, we have two small 
kinks at the lower income distribution and two larger 
kinks at the higher income group.  
 
On the other hand, the post-reform years have 
undergo a different pattern of changes in the marginal 
tax rates. The new tax rule starts with a higher first 
income threshold of IDR 50 million, with the reported 
taxable income up to this level is subject to a 5% tax rate. 
The income tax rate then jumps to 15%, with a 10% 
increase in the marginal term, for the income level up to 
IDR 250 million. Correspondingly, the next threshold of 
IDR 500 million encounters a 10% increase in marginal 
tax rate. Interestingly, a lower increase in marginal tax 
rate by 5% occurs for the highest income earners, i.e. 
individuals reporting more than IDR 500 million of 
taxable income. 
 
Figure 2 displays the density distribution of taxable 
income in million Rupiah from those reporting between 
IDR 20 and 30 million. We find evidence of bunching at 
the first kink in the periods before the reform when 
taxpayers declared taxable income just before the first 
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threshold, i.e. IDR 24 million. There are peaks in the 
density before the IDR 25 million due to a 5% increase 
in the marginal tax rates beyond this limit. By reporting 
taxable income of not more than IDR 25 million, 
taxpayers are subject to the lowest income tax rate. 
(Figure 2 here) 
The evidence of bunching appears to be strong as 
the spike around the first kink point is relatively high 
compared to the other kinks (see detail in the Appendix) 
even though the size of this kink is relatively small. We 
can also see that this bunching seems to be stable over 
the corresponding pre-reform periods and even lasts 
over the next four years after the new income tax law 
has been implemented. On a wider income interval, the 
spike is more obvious than the ones around other kink 
points. 
 
In the periods after the reform, we can also find 
bunching evidence around the first kink point depicted 
by a peak in the distribution of taxable income slightly 
below IDR 50 million, as shown in Figure 3. This visual 
evidence of 2009 onward may not as strong as in the 
pre-reform periods. Nevertheless, these results from 
both figures provides evidence on behavioral response 
of declared taxable income due to discrete jumps in tax 
rate. 
(Figure 3 here) 
Furthermore, we find no clear evidence of 
bunching at the other kink points where higher 
increases in tax rate apply. For instance, before the 2008 
tax reform, there is no visual bunching on the third kink 
point where marginal tax rates jump from 15% to 25%. 
This evidence is followed by the next kink, i.e. around 
IDR 100 million of taxable income where the tax rate 
jumps to 35%. Detail graphs are presented in the 
Appendix. 
 
It is surprising that we cannot find bunching 
evidence for the higher kink points even though these 
kinks are large. This result demonstrates a deviation 
from the prediction in the literature that a large kink will 
induce significant change in the individuals’ income 
(Bastani & Selin 2014). 
 
However, possible explanations may justify these 
results. Firstly, these results may be driven by the 
economic structure that is dominated by the lower 
taxable income group. It is important to note that 70% 
of these individual tax filers report taxable income 
below IDR 25 million for each year. Consequently, 
bunching would not appear in higher kinks due to the 
lack of mass of high-income individuals. The small 
number of individuals declaring income around the two 
highest kink points contributes to the lesser visibility of 
responses. In addition, Saez (2010, p.211) noted that the 
first kink is the area in which the lower income taxpayers 
laid in the distribution, and these taxpayers may have 
difficulties in understanding more details of the tax 
system. In our case, the proportion of taxpayers 
declaring taxable income below the third kink, i.e. IDR 
100 million, is 94.3% of all 524 thousand tax filers in 
2008. Therefore, income response from a mass of 
taxpayers accounting for less than 6% of total 
individuals in 2008 cannot produce a visible spike in the 
data distribution.  
4.3 Inertia of bunching from the previous kink 
point 
Figure 2 also presents further compelling evidence 
of inertia of bunching with taxpayers still bunching from 
2009 onward at the location of the first kink point of pre-
reform, i.e. IDR 24 million. In the periods prior to the 
income tax reform, this excess mass in the data 
distribution represents bunching at the first kink point 
where the IDR 24 million is the income cutoff for the 
imposition of a 10% tax rate. In 2009 where the new tax 
law applies, the first kink point was then shifted to IDR 
50 million where up to this level the taxpayers have to 
pay income tax at 5%, while beyond this income cutoff, 
the tax rate applied is 10%. We expected that people 
would show bunching around IDR 25 million up to 2008 
and then move to a level around IDR 50 million for 2009 
onward. 
 
However, when the kink point was shifted to a 
higher income level, i.e. IDR 50 million in 2009, we find 
a huge spike of self-employed taxpayers around IDR 24 
million. This means that some people kept declaring 
income at the same level from previous years even 
though declaration at this point does not provide tax 
filers with an incentive such as lower marginal rate since 
the threshold now is set to IDR 50 million. The graph 
shows that the spike emerges in 2006, continues in 
2012, then decreases in 2013, and disappears in 2014. 
This result suggests that there is a delay in recognizing 
the new tax rules, for four years of the implementation, 
when people start realizing that the income threshold 
for a higher tax rate has shifted. 
 
We extend the analysis and take a closer look at 
the data distribution of taxpayers who reported income 
around these two kink points: 24 and 50 million. We 
take a small value of income, 𝜀, and draw the density 
distribution of people declaring income between 
(25 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜀, 25 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛). We should see high 
masses in the density distribution of this group 
especially for the periods of 2006-2008. We draw the 
distribution of taxpayers reporting income within the 
interval of (50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜀, 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛) in similar 
fashion, and then compare the results to the previous 
income interval, (25 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜀, 25 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛). 
Similarly, we expect a higher density of income ranging 
(50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜀, 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛) in 2009 onward as this 
represents the first cutoff point for an increase in 
marginal tax rate. 
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Table 4 provides the density of each income 
interval, with the 𝜀 is set to IDR 1 million. We also 
provide robustness check with more 𝜀 values, i.e. 0.5, 
0.2, and 0.1. It is obvious that the pre-reform density 
exhibits higher values than post-reform ones for 
taxpayers within the (25 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜀, 25 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
interval at any values of 𝜀. Despite the clear spikes at the 
histogram shown in Figure 2 for 2009 onward, we find 
that there is decreasing trend in the total number of 
taxpayers reporting income around IDR 25 million after 
the 2008 income tax reform. This downward trend in 
the density of these groups of taxpayers suggests that 
some people know that there is a change in the 
threshold for a higher marginal tax rate while some may 
neglect the reform, as we did not see a jump in the 
density figures. 
(Table 4 here) 
We also see an upward trend in the density of 
people declaring incomes in the range of 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 −
𝜀, 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 with any values of 𝜀 in post-reform 
periods likewise. This provides evidence that some 
taxpayers realize that the new income cutoff for higher 
tax rate of 15% has shifted to IDR 50 million so that 
reporting less than this cutoff level will not have the 
consequence of paying more taxes. Interestingly, this 
increasing trend in 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜀, 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 group 
runs more smoothly than the decreasing trend in the 
lower income interval suggesting that only some of the 
people reporting around IDR 24 million in 2008 
contribute to the increase in the distribution of the  
 
We provide a graphical density distribution in 
Figure 4 to show the changes clearly. The slopes of the 
decreasing trend in the proportion of taxpayers 
declaring income around IDR 25 million in the periods 
prior to the income tax reform are steeper than the 
slopes of increasing movement from IDR 50 million 
group. The upward trend for the taxpayers in the 
income interval of 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝜀, 50 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 is 
relatively flatter and this means that the proportion of 
this group of taxpayers only increases slightly. In spite of 
this small growth, we still see clear evidence of bunching 
around this kink point in 2009 as shown in Figure 2. 
Moreover, this result supports our result of unusual 
bunching from 2009 onward where taxpayers bunch 
more around IDR 54 million, which we discuss in the 
next section. 
(Figure 4 here) 
Despite its abnormality, this evidence of inertia is 
not meaningless; it casts light on the actual income 
response of Indonesian self-employed taxpayers. As we 
could not find empirical evidence of inertia in the 
literature, we justify our finding on this inertia of IDR 24-
million bunching with the underlying conditions of 
taxpayers and the system itself. Firstly, majority of 
Indonesian taxpayers are lower income earners, with 
more than 1.5 million of 8.7 million in total declaring 
zero taxable income, and this number is substantially 
greater in 2009 showing one-fourth of the 2009 tax 
filers. In terms of assets owned, the proportion of 
taxpayers having total assets below IDR 250 million is 
approximately 70% in 2009. It means that these lower 
income people may not need to consider the changes in 
the tax rates since these changes would not affect them. 
 
4.4 Extraordinary bunching 
 
In the post-reform years, we find observable 
graphical evidence of unusual bunching above the first 
kink (see Figure 3). There is a huge spike in the 2009 data 
distribution where self-employed individuals reported 
taxable income around IDR 54 million (see the mass 
between the black dashed lines and red dotted lines in 
Figure 3). In contrast, we do not find this bunching 
before the reform. This evidence suggests that the 2008 
tax reform induces tax filers to behave contrary to the 
prediction of the literature. 
 
We now look more closely at the data for 2008-
2009 to examine self-employed taxpayers who bunch at 
IDR 54 million in 2009 (see Table 5). We put identifiers 
on earnings ranging between IDR 50-54 million and 
similarly on incomes between IDR 25-50 million for 
comparison purposes. Of all observations in each year, 
88% of taxpayers in 2008 but only 38% in 2009 declared 
taxable incomes between IDR 50-54 million, while the 
proportions change for incomes between IDR 25-50 
million at 87% and 44% for 2008 and 2009 respectively.  
(Table 5 here) 
We then conduct simple analysis to discover how 
much taxpayers who are in the IDR 50-54 million group 
will declare on average and compare it to those outside 
the IDR 50-54 group. People beyond the IDR 50-54 
million group have a relatively higher income 
declaration of IDR 37.8 million, which is a 30% increase 
on their previously reported income. However, 
individuals declaring IDR 50-54 million will report IDR 
20.5 million on average with an insignificant effect of 
their previous declaration.  
 
This finding suggests that this bunching- the 
majority of taxpayers declaring taxable income around 
IDR 54 million in 2009, comes from some people who 
declared less than this amount in the previous year. If 
we extend the lower bracket similarly, those in reported 
IDR 25-50 income group declared IDR 30 million on 
average, while people beyond this group reported IDR 
39 million with 30% higher declarations than their 
previous income. This result confirms our finding of an 
unusual kink point where the bunching is driven by 
individuals who strategically declared taxable income 
around IDR 54 million right after the tax reform was 
enacted. In addition, it is unlikely that bunching 
individuals come from the taxpayers who declared zero 
income in the previous year, since on average they earn 
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more in 2009. Figure 5 provides visual evidence of this 
shifting behavior. Consequently, it can be concluded 
that these taxpayers are likely to have engaged in tax 
evasion previously since they declared more income 
after the tax reform without any substantial increase in 
macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP, in 2009. 
(Figure 5 here) 
We then plot the taxpayers whose incomes are in 
between IDR 20 million and IDR 60 million to see 
whether the unusual bunching resulted from the lowest 
kink in the previous year. In Figure 6 the green bars 
represent the 2008 data and the white bars outlined in 
red plot the 2009 data. We can see the changes in the 
spikes between the two adjacent years. We find 
bunching around IDR 25 million in both periods, with the 
lesser mass in the post-reform year representing our 
evidence of inertia of bunching in the previous section, 
while the bunching above the income threshold of IDR 
50 million exists only in the later year. However, this 
diagram does not suggest that the mass in 2008 around 
IDR 25 million shifted to above IDR 50 million in 2009. 
(Figure 6 here) 
It is noteworthy that the 2008 income tax reform 
includes an amnesty regulation, referred to as the 
Sunset Policy, in which individuals can pay back the 
taxes without being subject to criminal penalties. 
According to Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), once 
joining the tax amnesty, these taxpayers may then 
exhibit a guilt averse behavior which serves as a mean 
of communication to the tax authority. A guilt averse 
individual will experience guilt if he believes he let 
others down (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006), or in our 
case, it can be seen that the strategic preference of the 
guilt averse taxpayers to join the 2008 tax amnesty 
depends on their beliefs about the beliefs about the tax 
institution. They may think that it would be bad to 
declare incomes less than the first threshold after they 
had joined the amnesty program and cleared the 
penalties. Thus, they are more likely to report more than 
IDR 50 million in income in 2009. This behavior may be 
interpreted as their intention not to exploit the 
advantage of declaring less taxable income, or, in other 
words, not to engage in tax evasion. By reporting a 
taxable income of IDR 54 million, taxpayers are levied by 
15% marginal income tax rate in both pre- and post-
reforms. This behavior is in contrast to those who bunch 
below the 50 million point and are favored with a lower 
marginal tax rate. 
 
Extended analysis of tax liabilities may provide 
better explanations, as shown in Table 6. Some people 
may put more emphasis on the nominal tax liability they 
have to pay. Declaring IDR 54 million taxable income 
stipulates lower tax payment under the new law. 
However, this may not justify the extraordinary 
bunching after the reform since taxpayers have higher 
incentive to report income lower than IDR 50 million. 
(Table 6 here) 
Then, in the case of an individual calculating his 
disposable income, this individual may decide to declare 
a greater taxable income with a lower tax rate applied. 
As a result, this taxpayer earns a higher disposable 
income, net of tax. To illustrate, suppose an individual 
reported income of IDR 40 million (see Figure 5 where 
we suspect the unusual bunching comes from) in 2008 
decided to declare IDR 54 million in 2009, then the tax 
liability is given in Table 7. 
(Table 7 here) 
We see that the liable tax increases after the 
reform with the corresponding taxable incomes. 
However, this taxpayer experiences a higher income 
which counterbalances the higher tax payment. Then, 
we can conclude that the increase in his declaration is 
likely intended to keep the tax liability constant in the 
post-reform periods. By declaring income above the first 
kink, the guilt feeling may not arise if this person joined 





This paper explores behavioral responses of 
taxpayers toward income tax changes using 
administrative data. We conduct a bunching analysis on 
Indonesian tax return data from 2006 to 2012 to show 
how self-employed individuals behave in relation to the 
2008 income tax changes. This reform has shifted the 
lowest income threshold to IDR 50 million, which is 
twice as high as the previous cutoff with a 5% marginal 
tax rate. Hence, the kink points where bunching may 
occur have moved following the new thresholds. 
 
Bunching can be attributable to a reduction in 
effort of an individual to choose a certain level of 
income or can be due to a tax evasion. The Indonesian 
data show that more than 70% of the population earns 
less than the first income tax thresholds, of IDR 25 
million and 50 million. This means that if these people 
display bunching, it is likely that they are trying to keep 
the marginal tax rate applied to their income is the 
lowest one, or in other word they could be regarded as 
engaging in tax evasion since reducing their efforts to 
avoid paying higher tax is not an optimal decision. 
 
Having firstly investigated Indonesian income tax 
data, we find a clear evidence of bunching around the 
first kink in both time intervals: before and after the tax 
reform. More interestingly, we also find compelling 
evidence of bunching inertia where there is an excess 
mass of taxpayers who keep reporting taxable income at 
IDR 24 million in post-reform periods when the income 
cutoff moved to IDR 50 million. Furthermore, there is 
evidence of extraordinary bunching above the first kink 
point after the change to the new tax system. Closely 
analyzing the 2008-2009 data, we find that this unusual 
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result is driven by individuals who strategically increase 
their income declaration. 
 
Our results provide a new signal of tax evasion 
behavior which policymakers must address in order to 
enhance revenue collection. Tax audit can be one policy 
to deter evasion; however, this policy needs sufficient 
resources. Our findings constitute an advance warning 
of tax evasion by lower-income taxpayers, which the 
Indonesian tax authority may need to heed in order to 




Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). Income tax 
evasion: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Public 
Economics, 1, 323–338. 
Alm, J., & Martinez-Vazquez, J. (2003). Institutions, 
Paradigms, and Tax Evasion in Developing and 
Transition Countries. In J. Alm & J. Martinez-
Vazquez (Eds.), Public finance in developing and 
transitional countries : essays in honor of Richard 
Bird (pp. 146–178). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishers. 
Almunia, M., & Lopez-rodriguez, D. (2018). Under the 
radar: the effects of monitoring firms on tax 
compliance. American Economic Journal: Economic 
Policy, 10(1), 1–38. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2654802 
Bastani, S., & Selin, H. (2014). Bunching and non-
bunching at kink points of the Swedish tax 
schedule. Journal of Public Economics, 109, 36–49. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.09.010 
Best, M. C., Brockmeyer, A., Kleven, H. J., Spinnewijn, J., 
& Waseem, M. (2015). Production versus revenue 
efficiency with limited tax capacity: theory and 
evidence from Pakistan. Journal of Political 
Economy, 123(6), 1311–1355. doi:10.1086/683849 
Bruttel, L., & Friehe, T. (2014). On the Path Dependence 
of Tax Compliance. European Economic Review, 65, 
90–107. doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.11.002 
Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Olsen, T., & Pistaferri, L. 
(2011). Adjustment costs, firm responses, and 
micro vs. macro labor supply elasticities: Evidence 
from Danish tax records. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 126(2), 749–804. 
doi:10.1093/qje/qjr013 
Dwenger, N., Kleven, H., Rasul, I., & Rincke, J. (2016). 
Extrinsic vs intrinsic motivations for tax 
compliance: evidence from a randomized field 
experiment in Germany. American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy, 8(3), 203–232. 
Fack, G., & Landais, C. (2016). The effect of tax 
enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from 
charitable contributions in France. Journal of 
Public Economics, 133, 23–40. 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.10.004 
Heim, B. T. (2010). The responsiveness of self-
employment income to tax rate changes. Labour 
Economics, 17(6), 940–950. 
doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2010.02.010 
Khlif, H., & Achek, I. (2015). The determinants of tax 
evasion: a literature review. International Journal 
of Law and Management, 57(5), 486–497. 
Kiss, Á., & Mosberger, P. (2015). The elasticity of taxable 
income of high earners: evidence from Hungary. 
Empirical Economics, 48(2), 883–908. 
doi:10.1007/s00181-014-0809-7 
Kleven, Henrik J., & Waseem, M. (2013). Using notches 
to uncover optimization frictions and structural 
elasticities: Theory and evidence from Pakistan. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2), 669–
723. doi:10.1093/qje/qjt004.Advance 
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen. (2016). Bunching. Annual 
Review of Economics, 8, 435–464. 
doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015234 
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, Knudsen, M. B., Kreiner, C. T., 
Pedersen, S., & Saez, E. (2011). Unwilling or unable 
to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in 
Denmark. Econometrica, 79(3), 651–692. 
doi:10.3982/ECTA9113 
Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen, & Schultz, E. A. (2014). 
Estimating Taxable Income Responses Using 
Danish Tax Reforms. American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, 6(4), 271–301. 
Paetzold, J. (2019). How do taxpayers respond to a large 
kink ? Evidence on earnings and deduction 
behavior from. International Tax and Public 
Finance (Vol. 26). Springer US. 
doi:10.1007/s10797-018-9493-4 
Picur, R. D., & Riahi-Belkaoui, A. (2006). The impact of 
bureaucracy, corruption and tax compliance. 
Review of Accounting and Finance, 5(2), 174–180. 
doi:10.1108/14757700610668985 
Réthi, G. (2012). Relation between tax evasion and 
Hofstede’s 4+2 model. European Journal of 
Management, 12(3), 61–72. 
Saez, E. (2010). Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points? 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(3), 
180–212. 
Sandmo, A. (2015). The theory of tax evasion: A 
retrospective view. National Tax Journal, 58(4), 
643–663. doi:10.17310/ntj.2005.4.02 
Schneider, F., & Enste, D. H. (2000). Shadow economies: 
Size, causes, and consequences. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 38(1), 77–114. 
Schneider, F., & Enste, D. H. (2002). Methods to 
estimate the size of the shadow economy. In The 
INFO ARTHA, Volume 4 No. 01 (2020), 1-17 
 
| Page 10 
shadow economy: An international survey (pp. 16–
30). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University 
Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9781139542289.003 
Soliman, A., Jones, P., & Cullis, J. (2014). Learning in 
Experiments: Dynamic Interaction of Policy 
Variables Designed to Deter Tax Evasion. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 40, 175–186. 
doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.05.012 
Tan, F., & Yim, A. (2014). Can Strategic Uncertainty Help 
Deter Tax Evasion? An Experiment on Auditing 
Rules. Journal of Economic Psychology, 40, 161–
174. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.11.005 
Wijayanto, B., & Vidyattama, Y. (2017). Revenue and 
Distributional Impact Analysis of Indonesian 
Personal Income Tax Reform in 2008. Economics 
and Finance in Indonesia, 63(2), 97–113.  
Yuwono, T. E. (2008). Individual income tax in Indonesia: 
Behavioral response, incidence, and the 
distribution of income tax burden. Dissertation, not 
published, Georgia State University. 
 
 
BEHAVIORAL REACTION TO THE 2008 INCOME TAX REFORM IN INDONESIA: A BUNCHING ANALYSIS 
Chandra Tris Fajar Uji Putra, Ralph-Christopher Bayer 
 
   Page 11 | 
TABLES 
Table 1. Changes in Personal Income Tax Rate 
2001-2008 2009 onward 
Taxable Income Bracket 
(in thousand Rupiah) 
Tax Rate 
Taxable Income Bracket 
(in thousand Rupiah) 
Tax Rate 
Income ≤ 25,000 5 % Income ≤ 50,000 5 % 
25,000 < Income ≤ 50,000 10 % 50,000 < Income ≤ 250,000 15 % 
50,000 < Income ≤ 100,000 15 % 250,000 < Income ≤ 500,000 25 % 
100,000 < Income ≤ 200,000 25 % Income ≥ 500,000 30 % 
Income > 200,000 35 %   
Source: Law No.36/ 2008 
Table 2. Changes in Nontaxable Income  
 2005 2006-2008 2009-2012 2013-2014 2015 
2016 
onward 
TK/0: taxpayer himself 12,000 13,200 15,840 24,300 36,000 54,000 
K/0: for married taxpayer 13,200 14,400 17,160 26,325 39,000 58,500 
K/I/0: married, joint filing 25,200 27,600 33,000 50,625 75,000 112,500 
Each dependent, max.3 1,200 1,200 1,320 2,025 3,000 4,500 
Source: by the author 
Table 3. Tax Returns in Indonesia for Self-employed Individuals, 2006-2012 
Year Total Taxpayers 
Reported Taxable Income (million IDR) 
Average Minimum Maximum 
2006              418,384                 28.36  0       125,926.00  
2007              429,131                 30.82  0           57,679.53  
2008              524,950                 31.45  0       108,476.10  
2009              673,682                 34.83  0       326,458.90  
2010              680,896                 37.42  0       447,594.20  
2011              686,327                 37.21  0       231,967.10  
2012              744,115                 42.21  0       641,991.70  
Note: taxpayers experiencing loss will report negative net income, hence their taxable income will be zero 
Source: Directorate General of Taxes  
Table 4. Density Distribution of Income 
Year 
𝜀 = 1 𝜀 = 0.5 𝜀 = 0.2 
(25 − 𝜀, 25) (50 − 𝜀, 50) (25 − 𝜀, 25) (50 − 𝜀, 50) (25 − 𝜀, 25) (50 − 𝜀, 50) 
2006 0.00885 0.00310 0.00474 0.00154 0.00208 0.00061 
2007 0.00933 0.00336 0.00468 0.00172 0.00205 0.00068 
2008 0.00886 0.00326 0.00447 0.00166 0.00183 0.00065 
2009 0.00582 0.00309 0.00258 0.00150 0.00105 0.00073 
2010 0.00554 0.00339 0.00248 0.00169 0.00099 0.00089 
2011 0.00520 0.00345 0.00236 0.00173 0.00089 0.00081 
2012 0.00485 0.00374 0.00212 0.00187 0.00082 0.00088 
Note: this table presents the density distribution of taxpayers whose reported income is between the respective 
intervals. All values of income and 𝜀 are in IDR million. 
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Table 5. Data Summary for 2008-2009 
  2008 2009 
Observations   
Total 524,950 673,682 
Taxable income between 25-50 456,464 295,732 
Taxable income between 50-54 462,986 255,337 
   
Taxable Income (IDR million)  
Average 31.45 34.83 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 
Maximum 108,476.10 326,458.90 
Note: this table only presents the results of the investigation of changes in behavior of tax filers in 2008-2009 
who declare incomes higher than the kink. 
Table 6. Tax Liability Calculation of IDR 54 Million Taxable Income 
Pre-reform Post-reform 
25 million x 5% 1.25 million 50 million x 5% 2.50 million 
25 million x 10% 2.50 million 4 million x 15% 0.60 million 
4 million x 15% 0.60 million   
Tax liability 4.35 million Tax liability 3.10 million 
Note: see table 1 for applicable progressive tax rates and the thresholds 
Table 7. Tax Liability Comparison 
2008 (IDR 40 million) 2009 (IDR 54 million) 
25 million x 5% 1.25 million 50 million x 5% 2.50 million 
15 million x 10% 1.50 million 4 million x 15% 0.60 million 
Tax liability 2.75 million Tax liability 3.10 million 
Tax/Income 93% Tax/Income 94% 

























BEHAVIORAL REACTION TO THE 2008 INCOME TAX REFORM IN INDONESIA: A BUNCHING ANALYSIS 
Chandra Tris Fajar Uji Putra, Ralph-Christopher Bayer 
 
   Page 13 | 
FIGURES 
Figure 2. Density of Taxable Income: Pre-2008-reform 
 
Note: These figures plot the distribution of declared taxable income between IDR 20 and 30 million. 
We focus on the pre-reform periods in which the income cutoff is IDR 25 million shown as black-
dashed line. There is a huge spike on the income level of IDR 24 million in each year which is depicted 
by red-dotted line. Moreover, this compelling evidence on bunching keeps existing for the following 
years given the income tax system has been reformed. 
Figure 3. Density Distribution of Taxable Income: Post-2008-reform 
 
Note: These figures plot the distribution of declared taxable income between IDR 30 and 70 million. 
The black-dashed line represents income threshold for the first kink of post-reform periods, i.e. IDR 
50 million, while the red-dotted line shows the income level in which the excess mass lays out. 
 
Figure 4. Density Distribution of Income 
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Note: this graph plots the density distribution (see table 4). We can see the increasing and decreasing trends in the 
proportion of taxpayers within the income interval with various 𝜀. 
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Figure 6. Bunching Above the Kink 
 
Note: this diagram plots a comparison of the distribution of tax filers who declared incomes 
between IDR 20 million and IDR 60 million in 2008 (in green) and 2009. There are clear spikes 
in the incomes above IDR 50 million only in 2009. 
 
APPENDIX: GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE 
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Figure 8. Graphical Evidence of Bunching Around the Third Kink 
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Figure 8. Graphical Evidence of Bunching Around the Last Kink 
 
